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INTRODUCTION

In the U.S. healthcare market, patients are being asked to bear
an increasing proportion of their healthcare expenses.' Not only are
people paying more out of pocket for their health insurance,2 but
once they purchase this insurance they find themselves facing higher
deductibles, larger co-pays, and steeper coinsurance rates.' Evidence
is already accumulating that these higher out-of-pocket costs-this
greater amount of "skin in the game"-are reducing healthcare
expenditures.' But does it lead to better decision making? Does it
turn patients into savvy healthcare consumers?
Ideally, the financial cost of care would be treated as one of
many factors that patients consider when weighing the pros and cons
of their healthcare alternatives. In the same way that physicians
inform patients about treatment side effects before prescribing a
given treatment, they would also inform patients about the costs of
these treatments.' But many barriers stand in the way of making outof-pocket costs a part of clinical conversations.' This Article identifies
these barriers and discusses what would need to be done, both
clinically and from a policy perspective, to overcome some of these
barriers. Parts I and II explain how the U.S. healthcare system has
1. See HA T. TU & GENNA R. COHEN, CIR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE,
FIN. AND HEALTH BURDENS OF CHRONIC CONDITIONS GROW 1 (2009) ("In 2007, 28
percent of working-age adults with chronic conditions ... reported that their families had
problems paying medical bills in the past year-a significant increase from 21 percent in
2003 .... ).
2. See Alexander J. Ryu et al., The Slowdown in Health Care Spending in 2009-11
Reflected Factors Other than the Weak Economy and Thus May Persist,32 HEALTH AFF.
835, 837 (2013).
3. See id. at 836 (finding increased healthcare spending defined as "all
reimbursements made to the provider of care-copayments, deductibles, insurance
payments, and third-party payments").
4. See id. at 837-38 ("These differences suggest that a change in benefit design that
resulted in higher out-of-pocket expenses for enrollees partially accounted for slower
spending growth.").
5. See, e.g., Peter A. Ubel, Amy P. Abernethy & S. Yousuf Zafar, Full DisclosureOut-of-Pocket Costs as Side Effects, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1484, 1486 (2013) (arguing
that physicians should discuss out-of-pocket costs with their patients).
6. See id. at 1484 ("The current reality is that it is very difficult, and often impossible,
for the clinician to know the actual out-of-pocket costs for each patient, since costs vary by
intervention, insurer, location of care, choice of pharmacy or radiology service, and so on
..... ). Other studies show that barriers to discussing cost may include patient discomfort
in discussing cost, insufficient time, a belief that the physician would not have a solution,
and concerns that discussing cost would impact the quality of care. See G. Caleb
Alexander et al., Barriers to Patient-PhysicianCommunication About Out-of Pocket Costs,
19 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 856, 856 (2004). Barriers to discussing costs for physicians
include "insufficient time ... and a belief that they [do] not have a solution to offer ...
Id.
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evolved to the point where many people suffer financial burdens from
the cost of their medical care. Part III lays out how patient out-ofpocket costs ideally ought to be factored into healthcare decisions.
Parts IV, V, and VI describe a number of ways in which the U.S.
healthcare system falls far short of this ideal. And Part VII discusses
several clinical and policy interventions that could move us closer to
the ideal.
I. THE COST OF U.S. HEALTHCARE: A BRIEF AND BROAD HISTORY
For much of history, healthcare costs have not been a great
burden to patients and society for two main reasons: the lack of
effective healthcare on which to spend money and the abundance of
inexpensive healthcare.' In the nineteenth century, surgical
operations took place in rudimentary "theatres" without expensive
anesthetics or even perioperative antibiotics.' The few medications in
existence were plant-based remedies and a wide range of
questionable cure-all concoctions. 9 The physician's job during this era
in medical history was to comfort patients with opiates and comfort
families with information on whether the patient would survive.10 The
goal for physicians (especially non-surgeons) was to comfort and

7. See ROY PORTER, THE GREATEST BENEFIT TO MANKIND: A MEDICAL
HISTORY OF HUMANITY 595-96, 675 (1998) (stating that unlike today, patients of the past
notoriously self-dosed, "drugging themselves with a diet of home-brew kitchen physic,
shop-bought nostrums, [and] quacks' mixtures" and that physicians were plagued by "[t]oo
many worthless medicines [and] too few remedies"; today's medicine is marked by a
"spiralling [sic] cost of health care" brought on by "increasingly expensive ... patch-up
procedures").
8. See id. at 360. Hospitals in London and Paris in the early 1800s served as "theatres
for virtuoso sugeons" who performed operations attended by students, colleagues, and
spectators. Id. Most commonly, these shows involved amputations, and the only solution
to the excruciating pain was the surgeon's skill and speed. Id. The lack of anesthetics
during surgery led to almost unbearable pain in some patients. In 1809, a Kentucky
physician removed a fifteen-pound tumour from a fully-conscious woman who "sang
hymns to drown the pain." Id. at 363. In 1810, novelist Fanny Burney had a mastectomy
without anaesthetic, later writing that the agony was "excruciating." Id. at 364.
9. Id. at 365 (stating that early doctors attempted to dull pain with mandrake root
steeped in wine, sponges soaked in opium, and henbane (the "poor man's opium")).
10. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 7, 17-19 (1984)
(discussing the methods of medieval phsyicians and their focus on offering the patient
"comfort, reassurance and hope"; this sense of duty led many early doctors to advocate for
lying to fatally ill patients if knowledge of their impending death might seriously injure the
patient's mental state).
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prognosticate, since there was little they could do to cure their
patients."
With the advent of antibiotics in the 1940s, medical practice
evolved into a therapeutic profession.12 Wonder pills now killed
bacteria, lowered blood pressure, and dissolved blood clots.' 3
Chemicals promised to mask the pain of what could then become
increasingly elaborate surgical procedures. 14 X-rays enabled doctors
to diagnose previously mysterious ailments."s Amidst this burgeoning
technology, the modern hospital industry began to arise, 6 building
imposing structures substantial enough to house all this new medical
equipment, and filled with enough beds to care for the many patients
whose previously fatal diagnoses were now transformed into lengthy
hospital stays.17
11. See, e.g., NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS, DEATH FORETOLD: PROPHECY AND
PROGNOSIS IN MEDICAL CARE 5 (1999) (stating that in the early twentieth century,

"when effective treatment .. . was unavailable, prognosis played a key role").
12. See id. at 3 (stating that today, "diagnosis and therapy receive much more
attention than prognosis"). For example, pneumonia was the leading killer in the United
States in 1900. Id. at 5. After antibiotic therapy for pneumonia was discovered in the
1930s, the prognosis for pneumonia "improved substantially." Id. Simultaneously,
prognosis for pneumonia was neglected, and physicians turned their attention to diagnosis
and therapy. Id. For another description of the development of therapy in the medical
profession, see PORTER, supra note 7, at 457-58 (describing how the flow of new drugs,
including penicillin, brought about the "long anticipated therapeutic revolution").
13. See, e.g., Eric Kades, Preserving a Precious Resource: Rationalizing the Use of
Antibiotics, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 611, 614 (2005) (stating that "antibiotics have had a
dramatic positive impact on human health," including treating bacterial infections); P.M.
Esunge, From Blood Pressure to Hypertension: The History of Research, 84 J. ROYAL
SOC'Y OF MED. 621, 621 (1991) (stating that the first orally effective treatment for
hypertension was invented in 1957); Best Practice Guidelines: Warfarin, MT. DPHHS 1,
(2010), http://www.dphhs.mt.gov/dsd/ddp/documents/Warfarin.pdf (stating that Warfarin
was developed in 1948).
14. See PORTER, supra note 7, at 597 ("[T]he combination of anesthesia and asepsis
offered the unprecedented prospect of safe and virtually unlimited surgical
intervention."); id. at 610 ("Stimulated by technical innovations and driven by outside
pressures, not least the appalling wounds of two world wars, surgery moved stage-centre in
the twentieth century.").
15. See id. at 606-08 (stating that radiographs have been used in a clinical setting since
1896 and even aided in scanning for bullets during the Spanish-American War; early use
was often misguided, however, such as in the 1940s when benign menstrual bleeding was
sometimes treated with X-rays and radium).
16. See ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH: AMERICAN HOSPITALS

IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 206 (1999) (describing the importance of American
medical centers as research hubs after World War II, correlating with a rise in both
medical office practices and in medical incomes).
17. Id. at 105 (stating that "hospitalization became an accepted consumption good"
and hospitals became "stations for the diffusion of medical technique"); see also PORTER,
supra note 7, at 380 (asserting that by World War I, the hospital had become "the
headquarters of medicine").
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This increase in medical interventions was inevitably
accompanied by an increase in healthcare expenditures. In the United
States, for example, healthcare expenditures rose 10.6% during the
1960s, 13.1% during the 1970s, and 11% during the 1980s." Most

developed countries have constructed their health care systems to
minimize out-of-pocket costs." During the same period, the United
Kingdom, for example, created its National Health Service in the
aftermath of World War II, a system that has largely protected the
British population from out-of-pocket costs ever since.20 In Germany,
the government created its own national health system in the 1880s,
one built around non-profit insurance companies. 2 1 Of note, Otto von
Bismark established this system not to protect German workers from
healthcare costs, but instead to protect them from the economic
impact of lost wages. 22 Thus, only workers qualified for government
sickness funds, because only they stood to lose significant money by
becoming ill. 23
In contrast to programs established by other developed
countries, the United States failed to set up a national health system
during this period of bourgeoning health costs. Instead, the New Deal
created Social Security and unemployment benefits.24 The
complexities of health insurance prevented FDR's administration

18. See CrRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NAT'L HEALTH EXPENDITURES
TABLES 2012, available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/tables.pdf
(last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (showing a rise in healthcare expenditures from the 1960s1980s).
19. See T.R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR BETTER,
CHEAPER, AND FAIRER HEALTH CARE 19-20 (2009) (stating that Britain's out-of-pocket
costs are around three percent, while the United States ranks fairly high among wealthy
countries with seventeen percent of health care costs funded by out-of-pocket payment).
20. Id. at 107-08, 110 (detailing Britain's government-run National Health Service
which is funded by general taxation, as compared to the small three percent of out-ofpocket cost associated with private British medicine).
21. See id. at 67.
22. See id. at 67, 72-73.
23. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
237-38 (1982) (explaining that Germany's "first national system of compulsory sickness
insurance" only applied to wage earners to account for wages lost during sickness; the
program provided "insurance against the chief risks that interrupted continuity of
income").
24. See DAVID BLUMENTHAL & JAMES A. MORONE, THE HEART OF POWER:
HEALTH AND POLITICS IN THE OVAL OFFICE 53 (2009) (explaining why historians have
"largely granted FDR a bye on universal health coverage" because of the tangled politics
of Depresion-era America, other reforms passed such as Social Security, his waning
political fortunes, World War II, and his ill health).
DATA
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from attempting to pass federal health insurance legislation. 25 As a
result, the U.S. healthcare system evolved to be largely employerbased, with companies offering private health insurance as a way to
attract good employees at a time when the American economy was
booming. 26 American health insurance companies largely adopted a
fee-for-service model of payment as opposed to a more centralized
and structured system seen in health management organizations
(HMOs). 27 The fee-for-service model consisted of hospitals and
healthcare providers directly billing insurance companies, which
largely passed these costs on to enrollees through hikes in their
annual premiums.2 8
Medicare, enacted in 1965, perpetuated the American fee-forservice model.29 This law enabled elderly patients (many of whom no
longer had access to employer-based insurance) to receive the same
kind of generous, first-dollar coverage3 0 they had gotten used to
before retirement, because like insurance companies, Medicare also
adopted a fee-for-service payment system.31 Thus, the enactment of
Medicare created a huge influx of government money, allowing
hospitals and physicians in the United States to spend freely on
25. See id. at 53-54.
26. See STARR, supra note 23, at 200 ("Employers had a practical interest in using
medical services for recruiting and selecting workers, maintaining their capacity and
motivation to work, keeping down liability and insurance costs, and gaining good will from
their employees and the public.").
27. See Lalena J. Turchi, Health Insurance: Paying the Premium, or Paying the
Price?-ERISA Preemption and RICO's Recourse, 5 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 526,
534 (2008) ("The traditional health insurance model is fee-for-service, where a physician
provides services and submits the bill to the insurer for payment subject to negotiated
payment terms under the contract.").
28. See id. (outlining the billing procedure for fee-for-service model); Susan Adler
Channick, Health Care Cost Containment: No Longer an Option but a Mandate, 13 NEV.
L.J. 792, 794 (2013) (describing how, in recent years, rising health care costs result in
private insurers raising premium rates, shifting the burden to employers, who then shift
the burden again to employees).
29. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
30. First dollar coverage is a term used to describe "a plan that pays deductibles and
co-payments so that the beneficiary has no out-of-pocket costs." What Is "First Dollar"
http://www.medicarenewsgroup.com/news
NEWSGROUP,
MEDICARE
Coverage?,
/medicare-faqs/individual-faq?faqld=630d590d-d09b-4cb-8b9a-43e2c74flee7 (last visited
Mar. 1, 2014).
31. See Benjamin M. Zegarelli, Note, Terminating Beyond the Limits: CMS Is
Overreaching in Its Attempt to Regulate ACOs According to Antitrust Standards, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 781, 785 n.34 (2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(a) (2006)) ("Fee-forservice is the default model of Medicare payments to health care providers, whereby a
patient receives a certain treatment and the Medicare program compensates 'each
provider of services with respect to the services furnished by it.' ").
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constructing new buildings and clinics, confident that there would be
plenty of paying customers to recoup these investments.32 As a
consequence of this system, U.S. healthcare quickly became more
expensive than most other developed countries. By 1970, the United
States spent 7.4% of its GDP on healthcare versus only 4.5% in the
United Kingdom."
More importantly for the purposes of this Article, the U.S. feefor-service model created a system of price insensitivity.' The
country was so wealthy, such a dominant economic force, that
employers could provide generous benefits to employees and the
government could afford to pay off its population's rapidly growing
medical bills. Healthcare consumers, too, were given little reason to
pay attention to healthcare prices. Employees paid only a small
portion of their health insurance premiums, with employers picking
up the bulk of the tab." In addition, the U.S. government subsidized
these health insurance premiums, which allowed Americans to pay
their premiums out of pre-tax dollars.36 Medicare, too, proved
artificially inexpensive for its recipients, who did not pay the full cost
of their coverage; they were subsidized by younger Americans.3 7 In
effect, American healthcare consumers were raised in a culture of
false affordability.

32. See STEVENS, supra note 16, at 284 ("Medicare gave hospitals a license to
spend.").
33. Howard Oxley & Maitland MacFarlan, Health Care Reform: ControllingSpending
and IncreasingEfficiency 60 tbl.1 (OECD Econ. Dep't, Working Paper No. 149, 1994).
34. See id. (manuscript at 54).
35. See THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST,
EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2013 ANNUAL SURVEY 70 exhibit 6.1 (2013), available at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/8465-employer-health-benefits20131.pdf. Although healthcare costs continue to rise, it remains true that employers pay
the bulk of an employee's health insurance premium. Since 1999, employers have paid, on
average, between 70-74% of a covered family's premium and between 81-86% of a single
employee's premium. See id
36. See Amy B. Monahan, Health Insurance Risk Pooling and Social Solidarity: A
Response to Professor David Hyman, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 325, 331 (2008) (citing I.R.C.
§§ 106, 125, 162(l)(1)(b) (2006)) ("[O]nly self-employed individuals and those who receive
coverage through their employer may pay health insurance premiums on a pre-tax
basis.").
37. See STARR, supra note 23, at 385 ("As third parties, both private insurers and
government programs effectively insulate patients and providers from the true cost of
treatment decisions .... ); see also DAVID GOLDHILL, CATASTROPHIC CARE 143 (2013)
(pointing out that Medicare is primarily funded by payroll taxes and general government
revenues).
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II. THE RISING BURDEN OF U.S. HEALTHCARE EXPENDITURES

Eventually, the cost of healthcare began to burden Americans.
Health insurance premiums rose so quickly that they put American
companies at a competitive disadvantage.38 By one estimate, the price
of a typical U.S. automobile includes $1,200 to pay for employee
health insurance, versus only $215 for a vehicle made in Japan.3 9
Indeed, an argument can be made that U.S. healthcare costs have
sped the process of economic globalization and outsourcing.4 In
addition, employees eventually began to feel the burden of their
healthcare costs. Employee contributions to annual health insurance
premiums almost doubled between 1999 and 2013, from $1,543 per
employee to over $4,500.1 Less noticed, but perhaps more
importantly, the rise in health insurance premiums limited U.S. wage
growth, since money spent on health benefits was thereby not
available as wages.42 In the absence of rising healthcare costs, U.S.
workers would have seen significantly more take-home pay over this
period.4 3
38. See Toni Johnson, Healthcare Costs and U.S. Competitiveness, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/competitiveness/healthcare-costs-uscompetitiveness/p13325 (noting that some economists believe rapidly rising health care
costs "can put [U.S. companies] at a substantial competitive disadvantage in the
international marketplace"); James Sherk, Auto Bailout Ignores Excessive Labor Costs,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008
Other commentators, however, have
/11/auto-bailout-ignores-excessive-labor-costs.
indicated that American companies are more likely to pass along increasing costs to their
employees rather than to consumers. See, e.g., GOLDHILL, supra note 37, at 56 ("Many
[employers] are cutting back on their benefits packages and increasing deductibles, copays, or employee shares of premiums. In other words, to avoid cutting pay, they are
passing on more costs to their employees."). Of course, despite scholars' disagreement on
the "degree to which health care affects U.S. industries," the two courses of action are not
mutually exclusive. See Johnson, supra.
39. Sherk, supra note 38, at 2.
40. See, e.g., Robert S. Galvin & Suzanne Delbanco, Perspective: Why Employers
Need to Rethink How They Buy Health Care, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1549, 1550 (2005) ("The
growth in global outsourcing of labor [has been] driven at least in part by the high cost of
health care . . . .").
41. See THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, supra
note 35, at 70 Ex. 6.4.
42. See GOLDHILL, supra note 37, at 55 ("With health care expenses increasing faster
than inflation ... [and] overall economic growth ... we've clearly seen the impact of
higher health insurance premiums in slower wage growth."). Goldhill gives the simple
example of a worker whose total value to her employer is $40,000, of which $5,000 comes
to her in the form of health care benefits and $35,000 as wages. Id. at 54-55. When the
growth of health care expenses outpaces the growth of inflation and economic growth,
health care takes a greater proportion of her total compensation, thereby crowding out
wage growth. Id. at 55-56.
43. See id. at 55.
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Meanwhile, healthcare costs eventually burdened the U.S.
government, as an increasing proportion of the federal budget began
to be spent on healthcare." In 1970, five years after Medicare and
Medicaid were established, healthcare accounted for 7.1% of federal
expenditures.45 By 2012, that amount had risen to 26.1%.46 The same
goes for state governments, which share the cost of administering
Medicaid, a program which pays healthcare expenses for some lowincome populations.47
But the financial burden most relevant for the purposes of this
Article is the increasing cost of healthcare borne by patients as a
result of the specific healthcare services they receive-the "out-ofpocket costs" associated with their healthcare. To be clear on what I
am referring to by out-of-pocket costs, I distinguish between two
kinds of direct healthcare expenses that patients owe: (1) patients'
portion of their health insurancepremiums; and (2) the post-insurance

costs patients pay for healthcare services which are not covered by
their insurance. These latter costs typically fall into one of three
categories:
(A) deductibles-the amount of money a given patient or
family spends before their health insurance "kicks in" to reduce
additional expenses;
(B) co-pays-flat fees patients are responsible for paying when
receiving specific services (e.g., "$45 for a physician
appointment"); and
(C) co-insurance-a percentage of costs for which a patient is
responsible (e.g., "10% of hospital costs").
In recent years, all three of these post-insurance costs have
increased. 48 The number of patients choosing high deductible
44. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL
YEAR 2014 HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 360 tbl.16.1
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2014
/assets/hist.pdf.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See generally About Us, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/AboutUs/About-Us.html (last visited April 7, 2014) (describing a partnership between the
Center for Medicaid and CHIP Services and states to provide "effective, innovative, and
high quality health coverage programs").
48. See Tu & COHEN, supra note 1, at 3-4 (noting that employers are "increasing
patient cost sharing in the form of larger deductibles and copayments" and "have pared
benefits and moved from fixed-dollar copayments to percentage coinsurance").
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insurance plans is growing, typically because those plans are
associated with lower monthly premiums. 49 Co-pays and co-insurance
rates are also rising.so As a result, insurance no longer protects people
as thoroughly from the costs of their medical care as it used to.
In recent years, healthcare spending has continued to grow in the
United States, but at a much slower pace than historical averages, no
longer growing at the rates it grew in the last three decades." Instead,
it has recently grown at an annual rate of closer to 3%.52 Experts have
argued that the current slowdown in U.S. healthcare inflation is
partially attributable to this cost sharing53 and have advocated that
policy makers expand such cost shifting to further control costs. 54
However, as a consequence of these increasing out-of-pocket costs,
patients are experiencing a corresponding increase in financial burden
from their healthcare expenses. 5 Due in part to out-of-pocket costs,
the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC") estimated that in 2011,
approximately one-third of U.S. citizens lived in families that were

49. See THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, supra
note 35, at 149 exhibit 8.5 (showing that between 2006 and 2013, the number of workers
enrolled in high-deductible plans has roughly quadrupled).
50. See Tu & COHEN, supra note 1, at 3-4 (noting that employers are now requiring
covered employees to make "larger ... copayments" and pay "percentage coinsurance"
for their health care needs).
51. See Ryu et al., supra note 2, at 835. Between 1980 and 2009, total health care
spending in the United States grew at a rate of 7.4%. Id.
52. Id. ("In 2009-11 the spending growth rate was down to 3.1 percent.").
53. See id. at 838 ("Rising out-of-pocket payments appear to have played a major role
in [the decline in spending growth from 2009-11], accounting for approximately 20 percent
of the observed slowdown."); Larry Levitt et al., Assessing the Effects of the Economy on
the Recent Slowdown in Health Spending, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 22,
2013), http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-brieflassessing-the-effects-of-the-economy-on-therecent-slowdown-in-health-spending-2/ (attributing some of the recent decrease in health
spending to "rising levels of patient cost-sharing in private insurance plans that discourage
use of services"); Andrew Pollack, Health Care Costs Climb Moderately, Survey Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/21/business/survey-finds-modestrise-in-health-insurance-premiums.html?_r=1& ("Premiums have been held in check
partly by increasing out-of-pocket costs that workers pay through co-payments and
deductibles.").
54. Michael E. Chernew, Additional Reductions in Medicare Spending Growth Will
Likely Require Shifting Costs to Beneficiaries, 32 HEALTH AFF. 859, 862 (2013) (noting
that the growth of public health spending could be limited "by shifting costs to
beneficiaries via higher beneficiary premium contributions (overall or via means testing),
changes in eligibility, or greater cost sharing at the point of service").
55. See ROBIN A. COHEN, RENEE M. GINDI & WHITNEY K. KIRZINGER, CTR. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL, FINANCIAL BURDEN OF MEDICAL CARE: EARLY RELEASE OF
ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JANUARY-JUNE 2011,
at 1 (2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/financialburden
_ofmedicalcare_032012.pdf.
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experiencing financial burdens due to healthcare.5 6 Indeed, out-ofpocket costs can cause patients to experience financial distress" and
can cause them to skip important medical treatments." -The Center
for American Progress estimated that in Massachusetts, out-of-pocket
costs for breast cancer treatment could reach over $55,000 for women
with high-deductible insurance plans.5 9 Moreover, out-of-pocket costs
for patients with uncomplicated diabetes could amount to more than
$4,000 per year, a figure that rises to $40,000 per year for a diabetic
patient with a heart attack requiring hospitalization.'
A recent study from the State of Washington demonstrates just
how serious the burden of healthcare costs can be for people with
serious illnesses.6 1 The researchers discovered that people with cancer
diagnoses were approximately two and one-half times more likely to
file for bankruptcy than their age-matched peers.62 If anything, the
Washington study underestimates the financial impact of health
problems. For starters, many of the people who file for bankruptcy
and did not have cancer suffered from other serious illnesses.63 in
addition, many of the people with cancer diagnoses did not have
advanced disease.' It is likely that people with lower burden of
disease experience lower healthcare costs and a smaller reduction in
their income, meaning that people with more advanced cancer likely

56. Id.
57. See S. Yousuf Zafar et al., The Financial Toxicity of Cancer Treatment: A Pilot
Study Assessing Out-of-Pocket Expenses and the Insured Cancer Patient's Experience, 18
ONCOLOGIST 381, 382 (2013) (discussing how cancer treatments can cause even the
insured to need nonprofit or government assistance).
58. See John D. Piette, Michele Heisler & Todd H. Wagner, Cost-Related Medication
Underuse Among Chronically Ill Adults: The Treatments People Forgo, How Often, and
Who Is at Risk, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1782, 1782, 1786 (2004) ("Many chronically ill
adults frequently cut back on medications owing to cost.").
59. KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, COVERAGE
WHEN IT COUNTS: How MUCH PROTECION DOES HEALTH INSURANCE OFFER AND
How CAN CONSUMERS KNOW? 8 (2009) (discussing the out of pocket costs to young adult
women on the lowest cost, highest deductible plan in Massachusetts).
60. Id.
61. See Scott Ramsey et al., Washington State Cancer Patients Found to be at Greater
Risk for Bankruptcy than People Without a CancerDiagnosis,32 HEALTH AFF. 1143, 1143
(2013).
62. Id. at 1147.
63. Medical debt is a factor in 53% to 62% of bankruptcies. Id. at 1144; see also
Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Managing Medical Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy,
10 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 239, 273 (2010) (finding bankruptcy filers often
underreport the effects of financial stress from their medical expenses).
64. See Ramsey et al., supra note 61, at 1145 (finding that cancer patients who filed for
bankruptcy were more likely to have localized, treatable cancers).

1760

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

experience bankruptcy rates more than two and one-half times
greater than the population at large.
One final note on financial burden before discussing the
challenge of improving the system: the burdens discussed so far are
largely borne by people with health insurance. 65 For those without
health insurance, the burdens are even greater.' Although the
proportion of Americans without health insurance should decline as
the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") 67 takes effect, many will still be
uninsured.68 That means that a large number of Americans will still
65. See James C. Robinson, Reinvention of Health Insurance in the Consumer Era, 291
JAMA 1880, 1881 (2004) (detailing contemporary trends in health insurance that have
increased co-payments for everyday medical services and increased the average
employee's monthly contribution to family insurance coverage); GOLDHILL, supra note
37, at 56-58 (discussing the negative impact of the recession on increasing employee costs
for their health insurance plans and the aggregate effect on their wages).
66. See, e.g., Steven Brill, Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME, Mar. 4, 2013, at 22
(detailing the misfortune of one uninsured person, "Janice," who was billed $21,000 for an
ambulance ride after experiencing chest pains-one line item of her bill was marked up
fourteen times over what Medicare estimates a similar test should cost).
67. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
68. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE
PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACt UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME
COURT DECISION 12-13 tbl.3 (2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default
/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012-CoverageEstimates.pdf (noting that coverage
for the uninsured will increase under the ACA by 2022, but because of several states'
decisions not to expand Medicaid immediately after the Supreme Court's decision in
NationalFederation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), six million
people who are otherwise eligible will not have Medicaid coverage); Jaime A. Rosenthal,
Xin Lu & Peter Cram, Availability of Consumer PricesFrom US Hospitalsfor a Common
Surgical Procedure, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 427, 431 (2013) ("The passage and
pending implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is nearly
certain to reduce the number of uninsured and boost demand for primary care, but it is
also nearly certain that there will continue to be significant numbers of uninsured and
underinsured Americans for whom the prices of healthcare services matter."); The
Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States that Do Not Expand Medicaid, THE
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 4 (Oct. 2013), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation
.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/8505-the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults8.pdf
(describing "coverage gaps" in which 4.8 million uninsured, nonelderly adults who fall
below the poverty line will not be able to obtain Medicaid coverage in states that have not
adopted the Medicaid expansion under the ACA). This problem is compounded by the
Medicaid coverage gap created by some states' decision not to expand Medicaid. See
KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, CHARACTERISTICS OF POOR
UNINSURED ADULTS WHO FALL INTO THE COVERAGE GAP 5 (Dec. 2013), available at
http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/characteristics-of-poor-uninsured-adults-who-fallinto-the-coverage-gap/. Nondisabled adults without children who fall below the federal
poverty line were set to receive Medicaid under the ACA, but some states decided not to
accept the federal money to expand the program. Id. Because the ACA anticipated these
individuals would receive Medicaid, the people that fall into this gap receive none of the
supports intended to help low-income people pay for coverage. Id. at 1. This means that
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face the possibility of devastating financial burden should they
experience an expensive acute or chronic illness. 69
III. How "SKIN IN THE GAME" OUGHT TO WORK
Many policy-makers continue to advocate for higher out-ofpocket costs for consumers or patients in order to increase their "skin
in the game." There are two primary goals policymakers have in mind
in increasing out-of-pocket costs to consumers or patients. One goal is
simply to relieve other parties of these costs, in essence to shift costs
from payers (be they employers, insurance companies, or
government) to patients. 0 The second goal is to bring more market
discipline to healthcare to incentivize patients into becoming savvier
consumers of healthcare services. With more "skin in the game,"
theory holds that patients should be less willing to undergo
unnecessary tests, to receive unproven procedures, or to consume
overly expensive medications.72
To meet the first goal of shifting costs, patients and physicians do
not need to change any of their behavior in response to these
financial incentives. Patients facing increased out-of-pocket costs
could simply ask for the same services they have asked for before,
and their doctors could recommend whatever tests or treatments they
would have otherwise recommended at the same everyday prices.
Even in this situation, healthcare costs will have successfully shifted,
in part, from payers to patients. Raising deductibles, co-pays, or comany low-income people will continue to go without coverage, even when the ACA is
fully implemented. Id. at 5.
69. See, e.g., POLLITZ ET AL., supra note 59, at 3 (describing the cost of three different
chronic illnesses: breast cancer, heart disease leading to a heart attack, and diabetes); John
D. Piette et al., supra note 58, at 1782 (finding that many chronically ill adults in a national
study took less medicine than their doctor prescribed in order to reduce their costs). See
generally COHEN ET AL., supra note 55 (analyzing the financial difficulties many
Americans have in paying medical care as determined by a nationwide CDC study).
70. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Many Different Prices Paid to Providers and the
Flawed Theory of Cost Shifting: Is it Time for a More Rational All-Payer System?, 30
HEALTH AFF. 2125, 2125 (2011) (describing cost shifting in the United States as the
phenomenon created by "an opaque system in which payers with market power force
weaker payers to cover disproportionate shares of providers' fixed costs").
71. See, e.g., Rosenthal et al., supra note 68, at 430 ("The desire for pricing
transparency is based in fundamental principles of economics; the assumption that if
patients know the prices of medical services, they will make rational decisions by avoiding
high-cost health care providers ceteris paribus.").
72. See GOLDHILL, supra note 37, at 33 ("We patients have bought into this model,
demanding useless antibiotics for viral infections, tests to rule out improbable diagnoses,
surgical procedures to lifestyle issues.. .. All this is ... a result of our use of insurance to
pay for everything.").
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insurance rates will, by definition, lead patients to pay a higher
proportion of their healthcare expenses. But if giving patients more
"skin in the game" does not influence medical decisions, and only
succeeds in shifting costs from payers to patients, then the overall
burden that healthcare costs place upon society at large will remain
unchanged. We would spend the same amount of money as we
currently do, but the money would be coming out of different
pockets.
But of course, when patients have more "skin in the game," they
make different medical decisions." Patients with higher out-of-pocket
costs consume fewer medical services than their peers.74 They are less
likely to go to emergency rooms for acute illnesses for example," or
to receive preventive services like colonoscopies or mammograms.
But does that mean that they are savvier consumers of healthcare
services? Unfortunately, it does not. The RAND health insurance
study found that people with co-pays consumed fewer healthcare
services than those randomized by the researchers to receive first
dollar coverage." But the people facing out-of-pocket costs for
services were unselective in their parsimony-they were just as likely
to forego necessary services as unnecessary ones.
For "skin in the game" to work properly, patients need to be
more involved in their healthcare decisions. Shared decision making
is a way to reduce financial distress and improve clinical choices.
73. See, e.g., J. Frank Wharam et al., Low-Socioeconomic-Status Enrollees In HighDeductible Plans Reduced High-Severity Emergency Care, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1398, 1403
(2013) (finding that enrollees of high deductible plans reduced their lower-severity
emergency department care, regardless of their socioeconomic status, which suggests an
attempt to minimize out-of-pocket expenses).
74. See JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE & THE INS. EXPERIMENT GRP., FREE FOR ALL?
LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 338 (1993) (finding that
the more a family had to pay out of pocket for medical expenses, the fewer medical
services of any kind they used).
75. See, e.g., Wharam et al., supra note 73, at 1403 (finding that when using a highdeductible health insurance plan, enrollees of higher socioeconomic status reduced their
lower-severity Emergency Department visits and hospital care, while those of lower
socioeconomic status reduced both lower and higher-severity visits).
76. See NEWHOUSE, supra note 74, at 178 tbl.5.19, 179 tbl.5.20 (showing that costsharing does reduce the use of preventive care measures among adult men and women of
various age groups).
77. See id. at 136 ("For 25 percent plans with a $500 [Maximum Dollar Expenditure],
total per capita expenditures fell 19 to 22 percent, depending on the size of the deductible,
when compared with a plan with no initial deductible (that is, coinsurance started with the
first dollar of spending). For larger MDEs the drop was 14-19%. Thus, the smaller the
MDE, the greater the percentage drop for any given initial deductible.").
78. See id. at 180 (stating that cost-sharing reduces the amount of appropriate and
inappropriate services in the same proportion).
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Shared decision making occurs when patients and providers partner
to determine which medical interventions maximize a given patient's
best interests, based in part on that patient's values or preferences. 9
As long as patients face high out-of-pocket costs, we face the risk that
patients will mistakenly forego necessary treatments or mistakenly
undergo unnecessarily expensive treatments. Ideally, the cost of care
should be wrapped into broader discussions between patients and
providers about the overall harms and benefits of treatment
alternatives. Patient out-of-pocket costs should be treated like a
treatment side effect and discussed as part of a more general process
of shared decision making. 0 Patients need to know about the pros
and cons of available healthcare alternatives, including the costs of
receiving those services, and then they need to factor those pros and
cons into their decisions. A forty-year-old woman considering
whether to receive a mammogram not only needs to know the
medical risks and benefits of this screening test, but also the cost, in a
co-pay or co-insurance, of receiving this test. Similarly, a patient with
acute bronchitis needs to be informed of the cost of her antibiotics, as
well as the cost of alternative antibiotics. Ideally, she would even
know the likelihood that the expensive versus the inexpensive
antibiotic would cure her infection.
Unfortunately, there is little evidence that healthcare decisions in
the United States regularly approach this type of rational,
consumerist ideal." Instead, many barriers stand in the way of turning
patients into rational and informed healthcare consumers.
IV. LACK OF PRICE TRANSPARENCY
Prices are normally a powerful tool for bringing consumer
pressure to bear upon markets.82 A gas station that charges five cents
more per gallon than the station across the street will not sell much
gasoline. In that instance, consumers realize that the two competitors
sell essentially identical products, and given the high visibility of each
station's prices, the market will approach maximum efficiencymatch your competitors' prices or go out of business.
79. See PETER A. UBEL, CRITICAL DECISIONS 213-14 (2012).
80. See Ubel et al., supra note 5, at 1484.
81. See UBEL, supra note 79, at 137, 154, 156 (arguing that rational decision making in
the medical context is difficult to attain, even for those who are well-informed, because of
the emotions involved).
82. See, e.g., Rosenthal et al., supra note 68, at 430 (stating that one of the
fundamental principles of economics is that consumers will rationally avoid purchasing
high-cost goods).
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Even when consumers realize that competitors' products are not
interchangeable like gasoline, prices still play a crucial role in making
markets efficient. For example, a consumer who perceives that an
Apple iPhone is superior to a Samsung smart phone will not
necessarily purchase an iPhone if she can purchase a Samsung model
at a significantly lower price. Consumers make cost and/or quality
trade-offs with virtually every purchase, and prices play a powerful
role in their purchasing decisions.83
But in the United States, patients rarely make such cost and/or
quality trade-offs when making healthcare decisions because most of
the time patients are not aware of the cost of the healthcare services
they receive.' Patients receiving hip replacement procedures, for
example, almost never learn the costs of the procedure prior to their
operations." Even though making this decision ignorant of the cost
would be irrational in economic terms, patients are not necessarily
foolish to receive hip replacements without gathering cost
information. For many people, after all, the vast majority of the
expense of such a procedure will be picked up by insurance
companies or government payers like Medicare.86 There is little
reason for patients to search out information on prices they do not
have to pay.
For similar reasons, most patients have little or no incentive to
comparison shop to find lower-priced surgeons to perform
operations. Typically, patients pay a flat co-pay for such a procedure,
meaning their costs will not vary based on their chosen hospital or
doctor. Frequently, however, insurance companies distinguish
between in-network and out-of-network providers, meaning patients
will pay much more (perhaps even the full cost) of the procedure if
they receive it from a provider outside the network. In this case,
most patients are likely to be extremely responsive to these costs,
because the out-of-network provider will cost significantly more than
in-network providers.' As this example reveals, healthcare markets
in the United States are not completely price insensitive. However,
this case hardly demonstrates consumer savviness as the primary
force influencing purchasing behavior. Instead, it reveals the
83. See Valarie A. Zeithaml, Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quality, and Value: A
Means-EndModel of Synthesis of Evidence, J. MARKETING, July 1988, at 2, 4 figs.1, 12.
84. See Brill, supranote 66, at 23, 34.
85. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 68, at 429 tbl.1.
86. See Brill, supranote 66, at 43.
87. See Robinson, supra note 65, at 1883.
88. See id.
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important role that third-party payers play in negotiating healthcare
fees.
Back to the consumer: imagine a patient with degenerative hip
disease who has either no insurance or a bare-bones insurance plan
with a very high co-insurance rate and/or a high deductible. This
patient has good reason to compare prices for surgeons in her vicinity
who perform hip replacement procedures because such prices vary
considerably. According to one study, prices for hip replacement in
the United States range from approximately $10,000 to over
$125,000.89 Unfortunately for this consumer, such prices are not easy
to discover. In fact, a research team collected price information on
hip replacement procedures and discovered that more than half of the
hospitals they called could not provide complete information about
the cost of this operation.' Many of the remaining hospitals did not
have such price information readily available, and the researchers had
to make multiple calls to these institutions before receiving price
estimates.91 This is not the behavior of a consumer-driven market.
Indeed, the wide disparity of price itself is a strong signal that the
market for hip replacements is not under pressure to price its services
competitively, at least when providing such services to people who
lack insurance.
As noted above, in considering prices of healthcare services in
the United States, we must always remain aware of the difference
between patients with and without access to third-party payers. Most
U.S. hospitals do not charge a uniform price for a hip replacement
procedure.' Instead, a given hospital will negotiate fees with local
health insurance companies, careful not to reveal the outcomes of,
say, its Blue Cross negotiation with other insurance companies, and
also hiding the results of these negotiations from competitor
hospitals.93 Perhaps it is not surprising that hospitals have such a
difficult time providing cost information when asked for it.

89. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 68, at 429 tbl.3.
90. Id. at 430.
91. Id. at 429.
92. Id. at 429 tbls.1 & 3.
93. See, e.g., Brill, supra note 66, at 22 (explaining how a hospital and insurance
company negotiate to include the hospital in the insurer's network of providers that its
customers can use).
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V. THE CHALLENGE OF GETTING PRICE INFORMATION IN TIME TO
INFLUENCE HEALTHCARE DECISIONS

To briefly recap the previous section: patients often have little
incentive to ascertain health care prices, but when they do have such
incentive, the price information is frequently hard to come by. But
the situation is even more dire than that because even if such cost
information were readily available, and even if patients were
incentivized to seek out such information, medical care often creates
situations in which shopping for prices is not feasible. First, there is
not always sufficient time to comparison shop. Moreover, one-time
healthcare decisions often lead to complex trajectories of care that
have important implications for patient out-of-pocket costs. Finally,
determining patient-specific costs is often beyond the capabilities of
both patients and clinical entities.
A.

Not Enough Time to Decide

A patient with degenerative hip disease may have time to shop
around for a good and affordable hip surgeon.94 The same cannot be
said for patients suffering from a wide range of acute and often very
expensive illnesses. Heart attacks often occur suddenly, for example,
leaving patients no time to do anything but get to a medical facility as
soon as possible. These patients often face a range of treatment
alternatives, alternatives with both medical and financial trade-offs.
For example, consider a patient experiencing a heart attack who
requires a procedure to prop open one of his coronary arteries."
Typically this would be done with something called a stent, a wire
device inserted into the lumen of the artery to keep it open after it
has been expanded by a balloon.96 Assuming for the purposes of
illustration that this stenting procedure is uncontroversially
indicated-in other words, it is what medical experts agree ought to
be done-the patient and doctor still face a choice of what kind of
stent the patient should receive. Until roughly a decade ago,
94. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 68, at 431 (concluding, however, that it is often
very difficult to obtain price information, even for a common elective procedure such as

total hip arthroplasty).
95. Coronary arteries are the vessels that provide blood to the heart. Anatomy and
Function of
the
Coronary Arteries, STANFORD
HOSP.
&
CLINICS,
http://stanfordhospital.org/healthLib/greystone/heartCenter/heartlllustrations/anatomyan
dFunctionoftheCoronaryArteries.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
96. See How Are Stents Used?, NAT'L HEART, LUNG, & BLOOD INST. (Dec. 17, 2013),
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/healthlhealth-topics/topics/stents/used.html; What Is a Stent?,
NAT'L HEART, LUNG, & BLOOD INST. (Dec. 17,2013),
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/healthlhealth-topics/topics/stents/.
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cardiologists propped open coronary arteries with bare metal stents.97
Think of them as tubular springs, pushing out on artery walls to keep
them open. The stents did a great job of opening up arteries in the
short term, but had a nasty habit of clogging up over the longer
term.98 In 2002, a randomized trial showed that drug eluting stentswhich slowly release clot-dissolving chemicals-are less likely to clog
in the long run.9 9 However, to keep arteries open, patients receiving
such stents need to continue taking other clot-dissolving medicines
for long periods of time.1" Strangely enough, those bare metal stents
do not require prolonged doses of anticlotting medicines because if
they stay open long enough, they get covered by a surface that is
resistant to clot. 1 ' Confused yet? Well that's the problem. In choosing
between these two types of stents, patients face a trade-off: between a
newer stent that forces them to take an expensive pill (the cost of
which will be partly borne by the patient), and a standard stent which
may not work as well in the short run but has a longer track record
and also does not obligate the patient to take any additional
medications.
This is a challenging decision to make for a host of reasons. The
facts are uncertain, the financial costs to the patient are not easily
obtained, and, most importantly, the decision needs to be made
immediately. Is it any wonder that this decision is made largely by
cardiologists, with patient involvement limited to passive acceptance
of physician recommendations?

97. See Patrick W. Serruys, Michael J.B. Kutryk & Andrew T.L. Ong, CoronaryArtery Stents, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 483, 483-86 (2006) (noting that prior to FDA
approval of drug eluting stents in 2003, more than 84% of coronary interventions were
conducted using bare-metal stents).
98. See St6phane Cook & Stephan Windecker, Early Stent Thrombosis: Past,Present,
and Future, 119 CIRCULATION 657, 657 (2009) (noting a high rate of stent thrombosis with
the use of bare metal stents); see also Stefan K. James et al., Long-Term Safety and
Efficacy of Drug-ElutingVersus Bare-MetalStents in Sweden, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1933,
1940 (2009) (finding that restenosis occurred less frequently with drug-eluting stents than
with bare metal stents).
99. Marie-Claude Morice et al., A Randomized Comparison of a Sirolimus-Eluting
Stent with a Standard Stent For CoronaryRevascularization,346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1773,
1773 (2002).
100. See id. at 1774; see also Anthony A. Bavry et al., Late Thrombosis of Drug-Eluting
Stents: A Meta-Analysis of Randomized Clinical Trials, 119 AM. J. MED. 1056, 1058, 1060
(2006); Laura Mauri et al., Stent Thrombosis in Randomized Clinical Trials of DrugEluting Stents, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1020, 1022 (2007); Jeffrey W. Moses et al.,
Sirolimus-Eluting Stents Versus Standard Stents in Patients with Stenosis in a Native
CoronaryArtery, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1315, 1316 (2003).
101. See Bavry, supra note 100, at 1060.
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Many medical decisions are made by physicians under time
pressure. Say, for example, a patient hospitalized with pneumonia
decompensates'02 and, just to be safe, the physician transfers the
patient to the intensive care unit ("ICU") for closer monitoring. ICUs
are significantly more expensive places to stay than regular hospital
beds.'03 Yet when patients are sick enough to require transfer to the
ICU, it is very difficult-sometimes impossible-to make time to talk
with them about the cost of such care. Moreover, most clinicians
likely would not deem it appropriate to hold such a conversation at
that time, when medical necessity looms so large. Even non-urgent
out-patient decisions frequently happen under significant time
pressure.1 0 In my experience, primary care physicians do not have
time during fifteen minute encounters to query patients about
whether to order a blood test to check for kidney disease, liver
failure, thyroid function and the like. So I expect that most physicians
decide whether such tests are "indicated" without discussing it with
their patients, leaving patients to pay their portion of the bill.
In determining how best to use patient "skin in the game" to
improve the functioning of medical markets, we need to do a better
job of determining which kinds of medical decisions are most
amenable to the kind of reflection and investigation that will allow
empowered patients to decide how they want to spend their
healthcare dollars. Meanwhile, we are largely left with a system that
uses patient out-of-pocket costs as a blunt instrument-a $45 co-pay
for all physician visits, whether or not those visits are discretionary, or
a 10% co-insurance rate for hospital expenses, regardless of whether
those expenses are avoidable. In such a system, we cannot expect
patient financial incentives to bring the marvels of market discipline
to bear upon medical practice.
B.

UnpredictableTrajectoriesof Care

Making medical decisions is complicated for another important
reason: a choice at one point in time can create a trajectory of care
102. "Decompensation" is the inability of the heart to maintain adequate circulation.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 323 (11th ed. 2003).

103. See Adrian G. Barnett et al., The Increased Risks of Death and Extra Lengths of
Hospital and ICU Stay from Hospital-acquiredBloodstream Infections: A Case-Control
Study, 3 BMJ OPEN 1, 5 (2013), available at http://bmjopen.bmj.com
/content/3/10/e003587.full.pdf+html.
104. Pauline W. Chen, For New Doctors, 8 Minutes Per Patient, N.Y. TIMES WELL
BLOG (May 30, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/30/for-newdoctors-8-minutes-per-patient/ (noting that increased time restraints limit new doctors to
an average of eight minutes with each patient).
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that has unknowable medical and financial consequences for patients.
Consider a patient with early stage breast cancer deciding between
mastectomy (surgical removal of her entire breast) or lumpectomy
(removal of the tumor and surrounding tissue, with preservation of
the remainder of the breast)." This is the kind of important decision
that is generally handled with lengthy appointments, in which women
learn about the pros and cons of their treatment alternatives. Early
stage breast cancer involves a choice in which the financial
implications of treatment alternatives may not be obvious to patients.
The main choice-between mastectomy and lumpectomy-may
appear to be cost neutral to most patients, who will pay a standard copay for a surgical procedure, making the two choices appear
equivalent. But the mastectomy choice may be accompanied by a
decision to receive reconstructive surgery, which may entail
additional procedures and corresponding co-pays.106 And the choice
of lumpectomy typically commits a woman to a six-week course of
radiation treatment with its attendant costs, and it also requires more
frequent post-operative imaging, given the higher risk of local
recurrence. Most women facing this choice will not be able to
estimate the costs of all these different procedures and tests. Indeed,
most physicians would have a hard time estimating these costs. To
date, no experts have determined the typical out-of-pocket costs for
patients choosing between mastectomy and lumpectomy. Patients
making this decision do so in a financial void.
C.

The Challenge of DeterminingPatient-Specific Costs

Making market-based medical decisions is also challenging
because different patients receiving the same set of interventions will
often bear very different costs. This is because the U.S. healthcare
system consists of so many different third-party payers. When
physicians are asked whether they commonly discuss costs of care
with patients, many state that determining such costs is too difficult,
rendering such conversations moot.s0 8 Once again, the medical market
functions quite differently than standard markets. People usually
105. See Bernard Fisher et al., Twenty-Year Follow-Up of a Randomized Trial
Comparing Total Mastectomy, Lumpectomy, and Lumpectomy Plus Irradiationfor the
Treatment of Invasive Breast Cancer, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1233, 1233-34 (2002).
106. See Eric Mufioz et al., Lumpectomy vs Mastectomy: The Costs of Breast
Preservationfor Cancer, 121 JAMA SURGERY 1297, 1301 (1986).
107. See id. at 1298-99.
108. See Alexander et al., supra note 6, at 859 (discussing the difficulty that physicians
have in determining patient costs and encourging patients to bring up cost-related
conversations rather than having the physician initiate these conversations).
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know how much they are going to pay for a pair of basketball shoes,
and the clerks at Famous Footwear do not need to check on their
customers' shoe insurance coverage to know how much to bill them.
Here we see a tension in how best to bring market discipline to
bear upon the healthcare system. If we standardize patient costs,
doctors and patients could more easily determine the out-of-pocket
consequences of given healthcare interventions, and therefore the
market could work more efficiently. In such a system, where more
patients are aware of the cost of their care, costs could more readily
be factored into a larger number of decisions. However, such a system
would also interfere with the healthcare marketplace, because it
would reduce consumers' ability to choose insurance plans that differ
in terms of their out-of-pocket costs, and it would reduce insurance
companies' abilities to compete based upon such factors.
VI. THE CHALLENGE OF DISCUSSING PATIENT OUT-OF-POCKET
COSTS DURING CLINICAL ENCOUNTERS

The preceding Part laid out a number of factors that make it
difficult for doctors and patients to discuss patient out-of-pocket costs
in time for such considerations to influence clinical decisions. Such
costs are often difficult to ascertain, and there is not always time to
factor costs into clinical decisions. But let us assume that a patient
faces an important decision, and her out-of-pocket costs are readily
available in time to influence that decision. Another set of barriers
stands in the way-patients and physicians are often unwilling to
discuss such costs, and even when they do hold such conversations,
they do not necessarily converse in ways that promote optimal
decision making. The following subsections explore some of the
reasons doctors hesitate to discuss the costs of healthcare they are
providing with their patients.
A.

Reluctance to Discuss Costs of Care

Studies have consistently shown that physicians and patients
often have difficulty discussing patient out-of-pocket costs during
clinical encounters. 109 Patients report being worried that bringing up
such costs will threaten their relationship with their physician.110
109. See id. at 858 (finding that at least 10% of patients and 20% of physicians studied
did not bring up costs when they wanted to on at least one occasion).
110. Roseanna Sommers et al., Focus Groups Highlight That Many Patients Object to
Clinicians' Focusing on Costs, 32 HEALTH AFF. 338, 341 (2012) (reporting that lowincome patients are especially worried about the relationship between costs and the level
of care).
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Physicians from several specialties-including general internal
medicine, cardiology, and oncology-report that they, too, are
uncomfortable holding such conversations with patients and worry
that such conversations will take up valuable time."1
The absence of such conversations causes avoidable harm. First,
it leads patients to receive unnecessarily expensive treatments. To
illustrate, consider a study of the financial burden of breast cancer
treatment that I conducted with Jessica Harris, Yousuf Zafar, and
Amy Alderman. In the study, we interviewed twenty-two participants
selected from a prospective, nationwide survey that the Duke Cancer
Care Research Program completed in 2011.112 We selected female
breast cancer survivors between sixty-five and seventy-five years old
and eligible for Medicare at the time of completion of the baseline
survey. Eligible participants had all received anti-cancer therapy for
breast cancer (chemotherapy or hormonal treatment) within the past
year.13 One of the women we interviewed reported telling her
clinician: "I'm not taking this if it's going to be $500 a month," only to
learn from her clinician that, "[w]e can put you on something [less
expensive that is] just as effective."" 4
Second, cost discussions would potentially benefit patients who
are willing to trade some chance of medical benefit for less financial
distress. This trade-off makes clinical sense if we think of financial
costs as treatment side effects."'s And yet, the majority of the twentytwo women we interviewed either reported never holding such
conversations or did so, but only when faced with financial distress.116
Most of these women did not discuss out-of-pocket costs at the time
they were making important treatment decisions. 17

111. See G. Caleb Alexander, Lawrence P. Casalino & David 0. Meltzer, Physician
Strategies to Reduce Patients'Out-of-Pocket PrescriptionCosts, 165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 633, 634 tbl.2 (2005) (identifying barriers preventing greater patient-physician
communication about out-of-pocket costs).
112. Zafar et al., supra note 57, at 385 (finding that treatment costs are not adequately
addressed with patients, especially those that will face financial hardships because of the
treatment).
113. To be eligible, participants were required to speak English, read, and be able to
interview independently.
114. Jessica R. Harris, Communicating About Costs: A Qualitative Analysis to
Understand the Out-of-Pocket Financial Burden Associated with Cancer Care 12 (May 1,
2012) (unpublished Master's thesis, Duke University).
115. See, e.g., Ubel et al., supra note 5, at 1484-85 (describing sacrifices made by
patients dealing with high-cost health care).
116. Harris, supranote 114, at 10 ("Many survivors discussed the cost of their care only
when the burden became unmanageable.").
117. Id. at 10-11, 22.
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Third, discussing out-of-pocket costs could benefit patients by
enabling them to seek financial assistance early enough in their care
to avoid financial distress. One of the patients in our interview study
explained:
My husband died, and we were in debt, I was sick, he was sick, I
lost my house . . . and I told [my doctor], that I could not afford

to take the Femara, " and she said, well, you can apply for help
... and I got help.1 19

One has to wonder whether an earlier discussion of out-of-pocket
costs might have saved the patient the loss of her home.
Clinical interactions are not cold, calculating market
negotiations. Instead, they often involve very delicate and personal
relationships. Patients want to trust their doctors and rely upon them
for guidance and comfort. They do not necessarily want to interact
with doctors the way they interact with used car salesmen, kicking the
proverbial tires and haggling over prices.'2 0 Similarly, many physicians
I have spoken with have expressed their interest in keeping financial
discussions out of the doctor-patient relationship, so that the
relationship can focus on healing and other purer considerations.
While to date this evidence is largely anecdotal, the strength of
physicians' opinions has been impressive. For example, when I
approached oncologists to see if they would allow me to record them
discussing the cost of care with their patients, the first few oncologists
I spoke with told me, flat out, that it would be unethical to discuss the
costs of care, even a patient's out-of-pocket costs, in the setting of a

serious illness.12 1
Another aspect of the doctor/patient relationship stands as a
barrier to more market-like interactions-doctors and patients
typically encounter each other in the setting of a major knowledge
and power gap. Physicians usually know much more about their
patients' healthcare alternatives than patients could plausibly learn.

118. Femara is a type of hormone therapy that reduces the amount of estrogen
produced in postmenopausal women and can be used to treat women with hormone
receptor-positive or advanced breast cancer. FEMARA, http://www.femara.comlindex.jsp
(last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
119. Harris, supra note 114, at 12.
120. See, e.g., John D. Piette et al., The Role of Patient-PhysicianTrust in Moderating
Medication Nonadherence Due to Cost Pressures, 165 ARCHIVE INTERNAL MED. 1749,

1750 (2005) ("[Platients who trust their clinicians may place a higher value on their
prescription drugs and be more likely to maintain adherence, at least when costs are
within a financially feasible range.").
121. Interview with oncologists, Duke University Hospital, in Durham, N.C. (2013).
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Patients often come to their doctors looking for advice. They ask
surgeons whether they should have surgery and oncologists whether
they should receive chemotherapy. These are hardly the kinds of
questions consumers would ask in many other market settings. No
one would expect a Toyota salesperson to give objective advice about
whether the best car for that consumer is a Toyota. People's reliance
upon physicians for clinical advice makes it that much more difficult
for patients to ask about the cost of their care.
B.

Difficulties Sharing in ClinicalDecisions

Even when doctors and patients seek to partner in decisions
(rather than let the doctor decide on her own), they often have
difficulty conversing with each other in ways that lead to optimal
decisions.12 2 Nearly thirty years ago, medical practice in the United
States experienced a patient empowerment revolution, with
prominent legal cases establishing that patients have rights not only to
information about their medical conditions but also to have a final say
about their medical care.123 The goal of the revolution was to make
sure that healthcare decisions would be based not only in medical
facts, but also on patients' individual preferences. 24 Unfortunately,
the ideals of patient empowerment are frequently undermined by the
norms of clinical conversations.
Consider the following exchange between a urologist and a man
about to learn that he has prostate cancer.'25 In serious tones, the
urologist broke the bad news: "Out of [twelve cores] there were three
cores that had ... . a little bit of cancer in them."' 26 In another minute
or two, the urologist explained this patient's treatment choices: the
patient could choose surgery, radiation, or active surveillance in
which the urologist would watch the cancer closely with blood tests
and biopsies. 27 The urologist also explained each of the choices in
elaborate detail because he knew that the "right choice" would
122. See UBEL, supra note 79, at 83, 87 (noting that one barrier to effective
communication between doctor and patient is language, both when physicians use medical
jargon, and when they use lay terms to describe medical care).
123. See id. at 75.
124. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 126-27 (4th ed. 1994) (discussing the importance of a patient's autonomy and
preferences in making health care decisions).
125. See UBEL, supra note 79, at 11. This conversation was recorded as part of a study
on how doctors and patients make these decisions, under the leadership of Angie Fagerlin,
at the University of Michigan.
126. See id. at 11.
127. See id.
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crucially depend on what the patient-a seventy-year-old manthought about the relative pros and cons of treatment versus
surveillance. 12 But before explaining these treatment choices, the
urologist wanted to make sure his patient understood the limited
extent of his cancer:
"We also grade prostate cancer on how it looks under the
microscope. We give it a score between 6 and 10."
"Is that the Teason?" [the patient] asked.
"That's the Gleason Score."
"Oh, Gleason Score. Okay," the patient replied.
"Yep, so 6 is what we consider the most low-grade, least
aggressive-looking, but it's the most ... it's just abnormal
enough for us to call it cancer. If it were any less than that, if
there were less atypical-looking cells, we couldn't call it cancer.
So it's just enough to get a grade of cancer and then that goes
all the way up to a score of 10, which is very abnormal looking
and is more aggressive."
"But 6 is the beginning number?"
"Yes, 6 is the least aggressive, 10 is the most aggressive."
"I'm used to, like, 1," [the patient] said, laughing.
"Yeah, well, the way we typically split it up is into thirds-low
risk, intermediate risk, and high risk."
"Right."
"Low risk is Gleason 6, intermediate is usually 7s-either 3+4
or 4+3, depending on how it looks under the microscope-and
then 8, 9, and 10 are all high risk. So yours was an intermediate
risk. So it's in the middle. It was 3+3 and 3+4, so just enough of
the atypical cells of the grade 4 to make it 3+4, which means
you're intermediate risk." 12 9
This conversation is remarkable not just for its inscrutability, but
for the very fact that it took place. In the 1960s, surveys of American
128. See id.
129. See id. at 11-12.
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physicians revealed that almost none of them informed patients of
cancer diagnoses if they thought such information would cause
patients to experience emotional distress.130 By the late 1980s, it was
"almost impossible" to find "a doctor in the United States who
withheld cancer diagnoses from patients."13 '
Unfortunately, as evidenced by this urologist's earnest attempt to
explain this patient's Gleason score, physicians' efforts to educate
patients about their medical conditions can fail when physicians
resort to jargon beyond a layperson's grasp. Imagine yourself sitting
half-naked on an exam table with the word "cancer" rattling around
your brain. Do you think you would be ready to comprehend this
conversation? Studies have established that jargon is ubiquitous in
physician/patient encounters, with doctors frequently using undefined
technical terms and patients rarely having the confidence or
assertiveness to ask for clarification.132 All too often, the result is
precious time wasted on ineffective communication despite the many
important decisions doctors and patients need to make together.
Medical terminology becomes so second nature to physicians that
they seemingly forget that their words sound like a foreign tongue to
many of their patients.
To make matters worse, physicians often fail to account for the
negative emotions arising during medical encounters. In one study of
senior oncologists, researchers discovered that when patients
expressed negative emotions ("I'm scared," for example, or "I can't
sleep because of pain"), the oncologists acknowledged and responded
to these emotions only one in five times."' The remainder of the
times they either continued talking, as if the patients had never
uttered these cries for help, or changed the topic to something less
difficult to talk about, often shifting to lecture mode, doing their best
to make sure their patients were adequately informed about their

illness.13 4
In my view, the patient empowerment revolution has stalled in
mid-course in large part because doctors do not know how to partner
130. Donald Oken, What to Tell Cancer Patients: A Study of Medical Attitudes, 175
JAMA 1120, 1122 (1961).
131. See UBEL, supra note 79, at 74.
132. See Cesar M. Castro et al., Babel Babble: Physicians' Use of Unclarified Medical
Jargon with Patients,31 AM. J. HEALTH BEHAv. S85, S92 (2007); See Sharon E. Barrett &
Jennifer Sheen Puryear, Health Literacy: Improving Quality of Care in Primary Care
Settings, 17 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 690, 693 (2006).

133. Kathryn I. Pollak et al., Oncologist CommunicationAbout Emotion During Visits
with Patientswith Advanced Cancer,25 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 5748, 5751 (2007).
134. Id. at 5748.
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with patients to make preference-sensitive decisions. In the old days,
in the more than two millennia lying between the time of Hippocrates
and the patient empowerment revolution of the 1970s, physicians
were the deciders-deciding what patients should and should not
know and determining what treatments patients should or should not
receive. 1 5 Indeed, the Hippocratic Oath compelled physicians to
remain silent if such silence would reduce patient suffering: "Give
necessary orders with cheerfulness and serenity, turning his attention
away from what is being done to him; sometimes reprove sharply and
emphatically, and sometimes comfort with solicitude and attention,
revealing nothing of the patient's future or present condition." 36
With the new paradigm, physicians have been knocked off their
"doctor knows all" pedestals, without being told where to stand. Too
often, physicians see their role as that of an information provider.
Sometimes patients ask their doctors for advice, and the doctors
refuse to help. Often, doctors respond to patients' requests for
treatment recommendations by saying: "It's not for me to decide, it's
your decision," not realizing perhaps that the patients have asked for
advice because they were overwhelmed by the information they have
just received."' Other times, physicians willingly provide treatment
recommendations, but only rarely after learning enough about what
patients care about to make recommendations that reflect patient

preferences.13 8
Our prostate cancer study demonstrated how difficult it is for
doctors and patients to make decisions based on patient preferences
even when financial considerations were not an issue. In the study,
men faced a decision between three treatments, with the best choice
for any patient dependent in large part on that patient's
preferences-on what that patient thought about the relative pros
and cons of active treatments that cause impotence and incontinence
versus surveillance-oriented approaches that would not cure them of
their cancer but would avoid these side effects. In this particular
study, neither doctors nor patients faced significant financial
considerations. The urologists all worked in the Veteran's Affairs
("VA") medical system and received salaries that did not depend on
the volume of procedures they performed. The patients in the study
were largely protected from the cost of their care by their VA
135. See UBEL, supra note 79, at 2.
136. KATZ, supra note 10, at 4.

137. See UBEL, supra note 79, at 3, 74-75.
138. The author is in the process of compiling the information in this Section into a
series of working papers.
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benefits. And yet still, our study showed that both physicians and
patients had a difficult time partnering with each other to make
treatment choices that reflected patient preferences. To begin with, as
mentioned above, urologists rarely assessed patient preferences
before making treatment recommendations. In addition, urologists
frequently took treatment alternatives off the table for what they
purported to be medical reasons-"you are young and healthy, so
watchful waiting is not an option for you"-even though those
treatment approaches were still viable.
Partnering between physicians and patients to make medical
decisions is made more difficult when finances enter into the
discussion-when the cost of care further complicates already
complex decisions. What happens when doctors and patients discuss
the cost of care in the context of important medical decisions?
C.

What We Talk About When We Talk About Money
Even in a system where financial considerations are often
discussed by doctor and patient, doctors struggle with how to present
the financial considerations in a manner that can inform the patient's
decision making. To date, there is almost no research exploring how
physicians and patients discuss the cost of care during clinical
encounters. The literature relies almost exclusively on survey data,
involving recollections of past conversations, with no detailed
observations of how such conversations are actually handled. In
hopes of addressing this deficiency, I discovered a pilot study
conducted in Singapore that recorded encounters between twenty
patients with advanced cancer and their oncologists."' These
conversations showed that patient out-of-pocket costs were discussed
in eighteen of the twenty encounters, a stark contrast to practice in
the United States.140 These financial discussions may be common in
Singapore, because of the prominent role that out-of-pocket costs
play in the Singaporean healthcare system.14 1 In Singapore, all
workers are required to contribute 6% to 8% of their salary to a
Medisave account, a tax-free medical savings account they can use for
a specified range of healthcare services for themselves or their

139. See Peter A. Ubel et al., Money Talk: Discussionof Patient Out-of-Pocket Costs in
Singapore Oncology Clinics (forthcoming 2014).
140. See id.
141. See Michael D. Barr, Medical Savings Accounts in Singapore:A Critical Inquiry,
26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 709, 710 (2001); Rob Taylor & Simon Blair, Financing
Health Care:Singapore'sInnovative Approach, VIEWPOINT, May 2003, at 1, 1-2.
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family. 14 2 This money rolls over year-to-year and can be passed down

to loved ones upon death.143
In an analysis of the Singapore data, several findings stand out.
First, cost discussions were initiated by a wide range of parties, with
patients sometimes asking about costs, families other times asking
about the costs patients will incur, and even oncologists initiating such
conversations.'" Second, discussion of costs occurred almost
uniformly after the oncologist had made a definitive treatment
recommendation.145 Typically, the oncologist explained the patient's
cancer status, for example by telling her that she has Stage 4 cancer,
and described the role that chemotherapy would play in reducing
cancer recurrence or prolonging her survival.146 The oncologist
continued to describe treatment side effects and explained what the
medical team would do to reduce the impact of side effects on the
patient's quality of life.147 Then, and only then, the oncologist
described how expensive the treatment was.148 Importantly, the cost
of treatment and the side effects of treatment were not presented as
reasons to consider avoiding the chemotherapy or turning towards
other treatments with better side effect profiles or with lower costs.14 9
Instead, the oncologist arrived at a treatment recommendation early
in the visit, generally based on the standard of care for maximizing
patient survival, and discussed the cost of care as just another
treatment side effect.'s This paternalistic approach to clinical
decision-making may be more common in Singapore than the United
States. But our Singapore analyses suggest one way that discussion of
patient out-of-pocket costs may fail to influence medical decision
making-by only occurring after patients and their doctors make
treatment choices.
Consider one encounter in which two relatives interacted with an
oncologist-in-training and a supervising oncologist to figure out how
to treat their mother, who recently received surgery for recto-sigmoid
cancer, a cancer near the end of the colon."' The patient was elderly
with a psychological illness that began when she was thirteen years
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Barr,supra note 141, at 712; Taylor & Blair,supra note 141, at 2.
See Barr, supra note 141, at 712.
See Ubel, supra note 139.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The information concerning this encounter is original data and analysis.
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old, which caused her to be "easily agitated," and on occasion,
"depending on her mood," also interfered with her ability to
understand. The patient's husband had died recently, after which she
began experiencing abdominal pain, pain that the doctors discovered
was caused by cancer. She had the cancer removed by a surgeon, who
found that the cancer had invaded three of twenty-two local lymph
nodes. The cancer in those lymph nodes had been removed, but the
patient still needed additional treatment, according to the oncologists:
Oncology Trainee: Based on her report, she does need
chemotherapy.
Daughter: Oh she does need. Is it because of?
Oncology Trainee: Basically, she has what we call nodal disease
Daughter: So it has spread, has it?
Oncology Trainee: There is tumor in these lymph nodes, yes.
Daughter: That's why you are trying to kill these cells?
Oncology Trainee: Correct.
After the young oncologist examined the patient, the daughter
asked about the cost of treatment:
Daughter: I would also like to know, if we plan for
chemotherapy, how is the financial, because it is a real difficulty
in payment. How can we get help?
Oncology Trainee: Who in her family is supporting her
financially?
Daughter: She is under my care.
Oncology Trainee: So are you working, right? And you are the
sole income in your family?
Daughter: No, my husband and myself.
Oncology Trainee: This one is not to worry too much about
costs and all that as it can be deducted by Medisave [the
Singaporean National Insurance System]. But if there really is a
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problem, the social worker can come in and help with the
finances.
The oncologist tried to minimize the daughter's concerns about the
financial impact of treatment, but the daughter was still worried.
Daughter: Our Medisave account also has very little and we use
it to pay for children's insurance and all that ... so if that

deducts, then no insurance for kids also.
The oncologist promised to refer her to a social worker, who could
help them find financial assistance:
Oncology Trainee: There is this thing called the Medifund. It's
a fund where patients come if they need help, can get
treatment, which will either be free or heavily subsidized ... so

don't worry too much about the cost and all that. We will sort it
out.
The daughter's forthrightness did not cause the oncologist to
swerve from the belief that the patient needed chemotherapy, nor to
go into specifics about the actual cost of the treatment, but did
increase the chance that the family would not bear the brunt of
related treatment costs. Discussion of cost is crucial if for no other
reason than to help people find financial assistance before they
undergo courses of treatment.
The oncologist continued the visit by describing the likely side
effects of the chemotherapy. At that point, the senior oncologist
entered the room, and the junior oncologist explained what two drugs
the patient would receive.
Senior Oncologist: So what are we giving?
Oncology Trainee: Xeloda and Oxali.
Senior Oncologist: You have to take into consideration her
condition. Who is looking after her?
Daughter: I myself.
The senior oncologist went on to explain what the treatment would
entail. The daughter explained that her mother might not allow them
to give treatment-she might get agitated and pull out the IV, for
example, or refuse to swallow the pill. The patient remained silent
throughout the vast majority of this encounter, in part because the
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discussion happened in English which, while she understood the
language, was not her primary tongue.
The senior oncologist became concerned at that point that the
patient would not comply with treatment, and explained the
magnitude of benefit from chemotherapy.
Senior Oncologist: Surgery alone-70% of patients like her,
stage 3, are cured already. But if we give surgery and
chemotherapy, then another 10% of patients like her are cured.
You understand? So there is 100 patients right. 70 will be cured
by surgery and if we give chemotherapy, we save another 10.
Prior to this point in the conversation, there had been no discussion
of the patient's chance of cure, nor of how chemotherapy would
change that chance. When discussing how much the treatment cost,
and whether treatment would put the family under financial duress,
these cure rates were not deemed relevant. But now, the oncologists
feared that the patient might not be able to psychologically tolerate
chemotherapy. And hence, they reframed the choice of
chemotherapy as being optional. After deciding the patient might not
cooperate with treatment, the senior oncologist recommended that
''we will just monitor her." After beginning to make follow-up
arrangements, another relative chimed in:
Family 2: So we don't want chemo?
Daughter: No.
Family 2: Don't want to try the tablet?
Daughter: No.
Family 2: Why don't we try it and then if don't work out, we
throw it away?
Daughter: The tablet is very expensive.
The daughter then turned to the junior oncologist.
Daughter: So, what do you think about the decision I took?
Oncology Trainee: Like the senior oncologist said, there is no
right or wrong decision because this case is a bit different.
Because let's say the patient can make decisions for themselves,
they can follow instructions, comply with their medications
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regarding the chemotherapy. We would do it because there is
an added 10% benefit of cure.
The junior oncologist then stated that the side effects of treatment
were outweighed by a 10% increase in survival expectancy, and that if
diagnosed with the same cancer, he would choose the treatment.
Oncology Trainee: But in your mom's case, it is a bit different.
In this patient's case, chemotherapy would increase cure rates by
10%, a benefit that both oncologists believed outweighed the side
effects and financial costs of chemotherapy. Only when the
oncologists discovered that the patient's psychological condition
might preclude treatment did they mention the 10% figure, in the
context of describing the likely 70% cure rate achieved by surgery
alone.
Were these oncologists correct to assume that any reasonable
patient would opt for chemotherapy in this situation? The oncologists
could have avoided this assumption by simply describing the benefits
and harms of chemotherapy and asking the patient (or her family)
whether they desired chemotherapy. Such a conversation would
respect patient autonomy and better inform patients than their more
paternalistic approach. Along these same lines, the oncologist could
have asked the patient or family whether they were willing to take on
the financial burdens of treatment in order to achieve the higher cure
rate. This family, in fact, was concerned that paying for such care
could compromise their ability to provide health insurance for their
children. At a minimum, the oncologist should have waited to make a
treatment decision until the full financial consequences of the
treatments were better understood. But even in a culture where
discussion of medical costs appears to be quite common, the
physicians and patients had a difficult time factoring the financial cost
of care into the clinical decision.
VII. IMPROVING THE HEALTHCARE MARKET PLACE

The days of first dollar coverage are gone for the foreseeable
future. We can expect Americans to bear an increasing portion of the
cost of their healthcare services at the point of care, regardless of
whether they receive private health insurance or Medicare."' And as
discussed above, at a minimum this "skin in the game" will both shift
152. See, e.g., Julie Appleby, Expect to Pay More for Your Employer-Sponsored Health
Care Next Year, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org
/stories/2013/december/20/expect-to-pay-more-for-employer-health-care.aspx.
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some costs from payers to patients, and also reduce overall costs by
dissuading patients from seeking certain types of care."' Ideally,
however, patients would only be dissuaded from seeking
discretionary care, and incentivized to make explicit cost and quality
trade-offs that balance their medical and financial interests. As we
have seen, this ideal is a long way from being realized.
Nevertheless, there are several steps we can take to come closer
to that ideal. Specifically, this Part describes several measures
necessary to improve patients' abilities to make informed decisions as
healthcare consumers. These measures are all largely unproven.
Therefore, we need more research on how each of these measures
influence medical decision making.
A.

Price Transparency
Out-of-pocket costs cannot influence medical decision making if
these costs are unknown. Clinicians cannot discuss out-of-pocket
costs with patients if it is difficult to determine what those costs are.
For medical decision making to begin to work like a normal consumer
market, healthcare prices need to be more transparent.
Fortunately, both governments and private companies are
working to increase healthcare price transparency. For example,
Massachusetts' 54 and New Hampshire'
have passed legislation
requiring healthcare providers to publish information on their prices,
legislation that has received high praise from consumer advocacy
groups.'56 A multitude of other states have passed price transparency
bills of their own. 57 It is too soon to know how well these laws will
work, specifically, whether price information will be easy to discover
in time to influence clinical decisions, and whether the information
will be specific enough to help patients determine their out-of-pocket
costs.
153. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
154. See An Act to Promote Cost Containment, Transparency and Efficiency in the
Delivery of Quality Health Care, ch. 305, 2008 Mass. Acts 1322 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of MASS. GEN. LAWS (2008)).
155. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §420-G:11-a (LexisNexis 2009) ("Development of a
Comprehensive Health Care Information System"); N.H. CHIS, https://nhchis.com/NH/
(last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
156. See, e.g., Price Transparency, CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM
http://www.catalyzepaymentreform.org/images/documents/CPRActionBriefPriceTran
sparency.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
157. See Transparency and Disclosure of Health Costs and Provider Payments: State
Actions, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health
/transparency-and-disclosure-health-costs.aspx (last updated Apr. 2014).
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One force which may make these state laws more effective is the
emergence of companies providing cost information to healthcare
consumers. I have spoken with a number of start-up companies in
recent months, all of which are trying to develop applications and
other software systems to give consumers accurate estimates of how
much they will need to pay out of pocket for specific healthcare
services."' In the world these companies envision, empowered
patients will pull out cell phones in their doctors' offices and question
their clinicians when the costs of recommended services appear to be
too high. Or, these patients will go home with a recommendation to
obtain, say, a knee MRI, and then compare prices at nearby imaging
centers. One company CEO I spoke with envisions physicians using a
tablet device, loaded with company software, to show patients the
costs of such imaging tests linked to a Google map of the area.5 9
Price transparency is a necessary step towards helping patients
factor their out-of-pocket costs into medical decisions, but it is far
from sufficient. Price information alone will not improve medical
decision making unless the information is better incorporated into
clinical conversations about the relative pros and cons of available
healthcare interventions.
B.

Improving CommunicationAbout Out-of-Pocket Costs During
ClinicalEncounters

For out-of-pocket costs to influence patients' healthcare choices,
patients not only need to know these costs before receiving
healthcare interventions, but also need to know the medical and
financial costs and benefits of alternative interventions. An
application may inform a patient that a medication for her
rheumatoid arthritis will cost $300 per month, but this information
will not help the patient make a good decision unless she also gets
information about alternative rheumatoid arthritis treatments. In
some cases, information about treatment alternatives will be available
outside of a clinical encounter. Patients can find information on
websites. 60 Sometimes they can find high quality decision aids specific
158. See, e.g., CASTLIGHT HEALTH, http://www.castlighthealth.com/ (last visited April
29, 2014); HEALTHCARE BLUEBOOK, https://www.healthcarebluebook.com/ (last visited
April 29, 2014).
159. Interview with startup CEO (2013). Identifying information has been withheld
because this information is not available for public consumption.
160. See, e.g., Medicare ProviderCharge Data, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES,
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trendsand-Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Datalindex.html
(last updated Jan. 8, 2014)
(providing a database of different costs for common inpatient and outpatient services); see
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to their situations that help them understand the pros and cons of
their alternatives.161 But often, information about alternative
treatments will not be readily available to patients, or the information
that is available will be hard for patients to interpret. In such cases,
patients will often rely on clinicians to help them sort through their
healthcare alternatives.
For shared decisions regarding medical treatment between
clinicians and patients to go well, clinicians need to do a better job of
partnering with their patients. To improve shared decision making,
clinicians need to: explain patients' alternatives in simple language;
assess patients' understanding of the information through "teach
back" techniques; 162 assess patient preferences relative to the decision
at hand;6" and help patients understand the role their preferences
play in determining the "best" choice.'" Our ongoing prostate cancer
research has made it clear that many clinicians fall far short of these
ideal practices. Other investigators have found similar
shortcomings. 65
Medical training needs to give more emphasis to communication
techniques. In addition, medical licensing boards and specialty
societies ought to do more to reduce the chance that clinicians
develop bad communication habits.

also Medicines for Rheumatoid Arthritis: A Review of the Research for Adults, AGENCY
FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.effectivehealthcare
.ahrq.gov/search-for-guides-reviews-andreports/?pageaction=displayproduct&productlD=1314 (providing a table comparing costs
of different rheumatoid arthritis treatments).
161. Annette M. O'Connor et al., Do Patient Decision Aids Meet Effectiveness Criteria
of the International Patient Decision Aid Standards Collaboration?A Systematic Review
and Meta-Analysis, 27 MED. DECISION MAKING 554, 554 (2007) ("Patients decision aids
(PtDAs) are adjuncts to counseling that explain options, clarify personal values for the
benefits versus harms, and guide patients in deliberation and communication.").
162. Andrew J. Jager & Matthew K. Wynia, Who Gets a Teach-Back? Patient-Reported
Incidence of Experiencing a Teach-Back, 17 J. HEALTH COMM.: INT'L PERSP. (Special
Issue) 294, 295 (2012) (explaining that a "teach-back" is a method where "clinicians
explicity request that patients repeat instructions using their own words").
163. See Richard Wexler, Six Steps of Shared Decision Making for Health Care
Providers, INFORMED MED. DECISIONS FOUNDATION (Feb. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.informedmedicaldecisions.org/imdf-provider-tool/six-steps-of-shareddecision-making-for-health-care-providers/.
164. See id.
165. See Clarence H. Braddock III et al., Informed Decision Making in Outpatient
Practice: Time to Get Back to Basics, 282 JAMA 2313, 2313 (1999) (finding that among
fifty-nine primary care physicians and sixty-five general and orthopedic surgeons,
informed decision making was often incomplete, signaling the need to encourage informed
decision making in clinical practice).
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C. Designing Smarter Incentives
Good communication about healthcare prices will help patients
factor out-of-pocket costs into their healthcare alternatives. But in an
ideal world, patients' exposures to out-of-pocket costs will be
designed in ways that promote good medical decision making. When
patients face choices between healthcare alternatives that differ
dramatically in price, for example, but differ only slightly in
effectiveness, it makes sense to require patients to pay a substantial
out-of-pocket fee for choosing the more expensive (and barely more
effective) therapy. By contrast, when the best alternative is
significantly better than the next one, and only moderately more
expensive, patients should not necessarily have to pay a great deal
out-of-pocket to receive that better alternative.
This general approach has been labeled value-based insurance
design ("VBID") by some experts." Early evidence is mixed on how
much VBID influences patients' and doctors' medical decisions.'67 It
is likely that VBID will not reach its potential unless patients'
healthcare prices are made more transparent and their clinicians do a
better job of informing them about their healthcare alternatives.
Another approach to better aligning medical decision making
and patient financial incentives is a practice known as reference
pricing.168 Take, for example, a 2011 decision by the California public
employees' retirement system ("CalPERS") which decided to give
employees an incentive to shop around for affordable orthopedic
services.'69 California public employees were told that if they needed
166. See A. Mark Fendrick & Michael E. Chernew, Value-Based Insurance Design:
Aligning Incentives to Bridge the Divide Between Quality Improvement and Cost
Containment, 12 AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Special Issue) SP5, SP5 (2006).
167. See Niteesh K. Choudhry, Meredith B. Rosenthal & Arnold Milstein, Assessing
the Evidence for Value-Based Insurance Design, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1988, 1992 (2010)
(discussing the "lack of evidence of impact on health costs").
168. See, e.g., Karen M. Wieghaus, Note, The Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003: The Wrong Prescriptionfor Our Nation's
Senior Citizens?, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 401, 413-15 (2005) (explaining what "referencepricing" is and its benefits); Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Sleeper in Health Care Payment
Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com
/2013/08/02/the-sleeper-in-health-care-payment-reform/?_php=true&_type=blogs&jr=0
(providing a comparison between a "reference-pricing" scheme and a tiered-insurance
scheme); David Williams, Assessing the Role of Reference Pricingin Healthcare,HEALTH
CARE FIN. NEWS (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/blog/assessing(discussing "reference-pricing" in relation to
role-reference-princing-healthcare
CalPERS).
169. See James C. Robinson & Timothy T. Brown, Increases in Consumer Cost Sharing
Redirect Patient Volumes and Reduce HospitalPrices For OrthopedicSurgery, 32 HEALTH
AFF. 1392, 1393 (2013).
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services such as hip or knee replacements, they could use any hospital
or surgeon they chose. But their insurance would cover only $30,000
of hospital expenses.7 0 That means that if a patient chose to go to a
hospital that charged $40,000 for a hip replacement, that patient was
responsible for the extra $10,000.171 The results of this program were
dramatic. For starters, patients quickly began selecting different
hospitals for their procedures, increasing the business to hospitals that
charged $30,000 or less for these procedures by 21.2%.172 In addition,
a number of hospitals that previously charged more than $30,000 for
hip replacements reduced their prices by an average of more than
25%.173
The thinking of the public employees' union was probably that
the quality of orthopedic procedures did not vary dramatically as a
function of their prices. By giving people an incentive to check on
prices before receiving hip replacements, CalPERS dramatically
altered the marketplace for such services in California. If this
program's success is any indication, practices such as reference pricing
will become more common in the near future.
CONCLUSION

My main goal in this Article has been to reveal the clinical
barriers to making healthcare decision making more closely resemble
the kind of consumer decision making common in other sectors of the
economy. We need to be cautious about assuming that exposing
patients to greater out-of-pocket costs will necessarily bring market
efficiency to the healthcare system. With physicians often still the
primary medical decision makers, and with patients often unaware of
the costs and benefits of their healthcare alternatives, we cannot
expect patient exposure to healthcare costs to lead them to make wise
trade-offs between cost and quality. Without better price
transparency, better physician-patient communication, and a smarter
alignment of incentives with clinical benefits, exposing patients to
more out-of-pocket costs will simply end up costing patients more
money, without improving their healthcare decisions.
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